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The events of September 11 th have brought forth much debate as to how the United
States should best deal with the asymmetrical threat posed by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and AlQaeda, a non-state terrorist organization with global reach. There is little debate that to eliminate the conditions that created and sustained Al-Qaeda requires, over time, the synergistic effort of all the elements of US national power; however, the immediate threat of another 9/11 mandates a global response to preempt further attacks. Dialogue as how to best prevent AlQaeda attacks has focused on such issues as rescinding Executive Order 12333 (assassination ban) and whether Al-Qaeda should be dealt with as criminals or combatants. As this war is being fought on a global battlefield, international law, both conventional and customary, national sovereignty, and the ability of the US leadership to legitimize the vision of a preemptive strategy all impact efforts to garner support in targeting Al-Qaeda.
During this paper I will argue that the case can be made that Al-Qaeda operatives are in fact combatants, targets under the rules of war, and that targeting of individual terrorists may not be assassination but a legal act in accordance with the self-defense provisions of United Nations Article 51 (conventional law). I will show how customary law is evolving to give states greater latitude to exercise self-defense and thus enable the United States to better address the Al-Qaeda asymmetric threat. I will also argue how the jus ad bellum (reason for going to war) criteria of last resort is the only resort to preempt future Al-Qaeda attacks.
Furthermore, I will argue that sovereignty is no longer absolute when a nation fails to take action against Al-Qaeda members operating within its borders. Specifically, as it relates to sovereignty, US soldiers may cross sovereign borders for the limited objective of eliminating the Al-Qaeda threat. Finally, I will argue the importance of legitimacy in building a preemptive strategy. Specifically, the United States leadership must focus on developing a shared vision of a preemptive strategy against Al-Qaeda as an organization, vice the amorphous Global War on
Terrorism. By developing a shared vision the United States can garner international support which will facilitate the strategic maneuver necessary, through cooperation with other nations, to preempt further operational acts of terror.
ASSASSINATION DEFINED
In its most basic form assassination involves the murder of a targeted individual for political purposes. 2 However, assassination is not a legal term; it does not appear in international law; it does not appear in the United Nations Charter; it does not appear in the Geneva Conventions; it does not appear in the Hague Conventions; nor does it appear within the scope of the International Criminal Court statutes. 3 Albeit not recognized in international law, the use of the word "murder" would lead one to conclude that assassination is in fact an unlawful act. What does appear in international law is the use of the term "lethal force."
Lethal force is authorized in two circumstances -as a matter of law enforcement or under self-defense provisions of United Nations (UN) Article 51. What matters is the circumstance under which the application of force is used -peacetime or wartime. In the former, the pejorative definition of murder applies as the individual targeted would be denied "due process"
under criminal law procedures. However, in the latter case, wartime, it could be lawful under the laws of war and thus not assassination.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333
On Is there such a thing as assassination during time of war? Yes, in the context of military operations there is one instance under the laws of war in which the term "assassination" is used that would indicate an unlawful act. If the act (assassination) were to be carried out in a "treacherous manner" it would be considered unlawful. 6 Army Field Manual 27-10 describes "treacherous" as putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy, dead or alive. It does not, however, preclude surprise attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere." 7 When applied against enemy combatants in a "non-treacherous way," the term assassination does not apply as it is the legal use of lethal force. Combatants are liable to attack irrespective of location or activity -the critical requirement is in determining if the target is a combatant. "as a military action against enemy combatants which would take it out of the realm of assassination." Moreover, that this is "…not a rhetorical war -these are enemy combatants.
COMBATANTS OR CRIMINALS
You shoot to kill enemy combatants." 20 Having declared war on the United States, targeting AlQaeda is a matter of self-defense.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PREEMPTION
Unlike terrorists….we do not believe the end justifies the means. We believe in the rule of law. This nation has long been a champion of international law.
-Former Secretary of State George Shultz
Sources of international Law are divided into four categories (in order of precedence):
first, conventions, treaties, and agreements (i.e., the UN Charter); second, the practice of states (customary international law); third, principles of law recognized by leading "civilized" nations;
judicial decisions and writings of jurists; and finally, scholars (i.e., International Court of Justice and International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia). 22 As US Army War College legal professor Tom McShane points out, "international law constitutes an important element of the geopolitical environment, one we ignore at our peril." 23 Germane to this analysis is an examination of the circumstances by which the UN condones an armed response (conventional international law), subsequent UN Resolutions specific to the aforementioned conflict, and how the historical evolution of customary international law increasingly conflicts with conventional international law. Finally, it is necessary to examine preemptive self-defense in the context of the Just War Tradition jus ad bellum (reason for going to war) criteria of last resort.
The UN was founded upon a post World War II (WWII) paradigm for the purpose of keeping the peace, by establishing a "normative order that would severely restrict the resort to force" between states. 24 Under Article 2(4) states are to "refrain in their international relationships from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." 25 There are two exceptions to the UN Charter for the use of force. Under Article 42
the Security Council can authorize the use of force against another state if there is a "threat to peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression." 26 The other provision, Article 51, permits self-defense in the event of an armed attack.
SELF-DEFENSE
There is no question but that the United States of America has every right, as every country does, of self-defense, and the problem with terrorism is that there is no way to defend against the terrorist every place and every time. Therefore the only way to deal with the terrorist network is to take the battle to them. That is in effect self-defense of a preemptive nature. Webster argued that, "the use of force in self-defense is justified when the need for action is "instant, overwhelming, leaves no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 28 Article 51 also reveals that self-defense is authorized only as an interim measure until such time "the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
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There are two important differences between the temporal relationships that exist in establishing the "imminence" of the threat; one being preventive, the other preemptive.
Preventive self-defense is best described as a strategic first strike that precludes the "perceived belligerent" from developing a capability that it may later use during war to threaten the belligerent who launched the preventive strike. Preemptive, however, is more at the tactical level when an attack is thought to be imminent and the intent is to deny the belligerent the ability to deploy an existing force (capability it already has) to commit a hostile operational act.
As Al-Qaeda is a non-state terrorist organization there are inherent complexities in determining the "imminence" of an ostensibly global asymmetrical threat. It is also equally difficult for the United States to determine when that threat no longer exists. Al-Qaeda presents an amorphous threat that portends to exist for an indeterminate time. The nature of the threat lends credence to the argument that the "imminence" of an Al-Qaeda terrorist attack can exist in perpetuity, until such time as Al-Qaeda ceases to exist as an organization.
In Also, where there is conflict, who is the final arbiter when norms and law are out of synch?
Writing for the Harvard Law Journal , Michael Glennon characterizes the international system as existing in a parallel universe of two systems, de jure and de facto. Glennon describes the de jure system as consisting of illusory rules that would "govern the use of force among states in a platonic world of forms, a world that does not exist." 45 The de facto system is described as "actual state practice in the real world, a world where states weigh costs against benefits in disregard of the rules all but ignored in the je dure system" which is disconnected from state behavior.
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History is replete with empirical data to support Glennon's argument that the continuous nature of conflict, the de facto actions of states, in the international system since WWII has not been sanctioned by the UN and thus would appear in conflict with the de jure system. "Between 1945 and 1999, two-thirds 49 The Bush Doctrine's policy of preemption will likely serve as the "basis for other countries initiating or threatening conflicts they might not otherwise have been emboldened to undertake." 50 Moscow has already seized the opportunity to invoke UN Resolution 1368 to justify military actions against Chechen rebels in Georgia -with or without the concurrence of the Georgian government. 51 Specifically, the case the United States makes to the international community for taking preemptive action, irrespective of the Al-Qaeda operatives' location and if not clearly codified in law, must be compelling and moral. Using the positivist's interpretation of self-defense in the international environment de jure, the case for legality, albeit important, is not the only consideration in preemption -a compelling moral case for preemption as a last resort must be clearly understood by the international community.
PREEMPTION AS A LAST RESORT
Unlike the Westphalian period, when the movement of armies foreshadowed threat, modern technology in the service of terror gives no warning, and its perpetrators vanish with the act of commission.
-Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
The international law of war paradigm or "Just War Tradition" is a disciplined attempt to "relate the morally legitimate use of…military force to morally worthy political ends." 53 The Just
War Tradition consists of two parts. First, the "just" reason for going to war, jus ad bellum , the second, how we conduct "just" war, jus in bello. For purposes of this discussion I will focus on the issue of jus ad bellum as it relates to preemptive targeting of Al-Qaeda as a last resort of self-defense. Jus ad bellum stipulates that war is just if: the cause is just; war is undertaken by a legitimate authority; the intentions are just (for the greater good of peace); there is a public declaration of cause and intent; proportional in that the damage will not out-weigh the good to be achieved; there is a reasonable hope for success; and finally, the pursuit of war is taken only as a last resort. There is little debate that the UN condemnation of the Al-Qaeda attacks of 
THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY
The time of absolute sovereignty has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.
-Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
According to former US Secretary of State George Shultz, "we reserve, within the framework of our right to self-defense, the right to preempt terrorist threats within a state's borders -not just hot pursuit, but hot preemption." 59 The 66 As noted in the Lotus case, "it is well settled that a state is bound to use due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its people." 67 If the state is not willing to take action against AlQaeda operatives then the victim state is permitted to enter the state but only for the objective of dealing with the Al-Qaeda threat -immediately withdrawing after the operation. 68 Furthermore, while it would seem self-evident, it should be emphasized that such operations must be precise in every aspect, with compelling intelligence warranting offensive operations.
While sovereignty may not longer be absolute, the Westphalian system is still alive and it remains in our national interest that it survives, albeit the future will no doubt see more change.
In a speech to the Foreign Policy Institute, former Secretary of State George Shultz cautioned that, "first and foremost, we must shore up the state system. The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as the basic operating entity." 69 Nevertheless, while operating in Westphalian system is preferred, the evolution of customary law notwithstanding, a self-defense strategy to eliminate the Al-Qaeda threat may necessitate cross border operations -operations that will require political strategists to carefully weigh second and third order effects as well as risk. We cannot be so naïve to think cross border operations are not without consequence; "we do not operate in a vacuum." 70 Operations against Al-Qaeda, and governments that support or harbor them, "will be challenged by competing considerationssuch as fear of entanglement in regional geopolitical relations, intra-state relations, or strategic economic relations with terror-sponsoring states." Pakistan. In the case of military action in the FATA, restraint must be exercised and it is therefore understood that preemption, seen as unilateral action in Pakistan's western territories, may not be acceptable. As it relates to Pakistan, the current US preemptive strategy must accept some risk granting Al-Qaeda a degree of safe haven in Pakistan's FATA.
LEGITIMACY
If the Security Council gave America its authority to attack Iraq, the war would become legal but for many people it would still be illegitimate.
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-The Economist, February 22, 2003 Comments above are meant to highlight that irrespective of the legal determination of a preemptive strategy, achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the world also requires some preponderance of nations to support that strategy. Thus far, I have argued the legal merits that could justify global US preemptive military action against Al-Qaeda. I have argued the following from a legal standpoint: we are in a state of war with Al-Qaeda; they are combatants; selfdefense is justified according to both conventional and customary law; preemption is the only resort; and in certain circumstances, operations against Al-Qaeda could take precedence over issues of sovereignty. While important, the aforementioned legal arguments can be significantly muted without some semblance of legitimacy as expressed by the cooperative support of other nations. While current international legal standards dealing with terrorism are the subject of much debate, international legitimacy can significantly buttress a preemptive strategy and enable our strategic maneuver in the war against Al-Qaeda.
Legitimacy also supports other US instruments of power, it helps facilitate global cooperation and it garners favorable public opinion. Legitimacy arises from the conviction that state action proceeds within the ambit of law, in two senses: first, that action issues from rightful authority, that is, from the political institutions authorized to take it; and second, that it does not violate a legal or moral norm. Ultimately, however, legitimacy is rooted in opinion, and thus actions that are unlawful in either of these senses may, in principle, still be deemed legitimate. Despite these vagaries, there can be no doubt that legitimacy is a vital thing to have, and illegitimacy a condition devoutly to be avoided. It should have been a war on Al-Qaeda. Don't take your eye off the ball. Subordinate every other policy to it, including the policies toward Russia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iraq. Instead, the Administration defined it as a broad war on terror, including groups that have never taken a swing at the United States and never will. It leads to a loss of focus….And you make enemies of people you need against Al-Qaeda.
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Creating the foundation of a shared vision sets the conditions for legitimacy around which we can rally international support, develop trust, and belay fears that preemption is a panacea for unilateral US action but rather a coherent strategy against an asymmetric threat that necessitates international cooperation. Author Thomas Bennett, in The Pentagon's New Map describing the lack of shared vision states that "our problem right now is not our motive or our means, but our inability to describe the enemies worth killing, the battles worth winning and the future worth creating." 85 While the intent of a shared vision is to create a multilateral approach, it is important to point out that the difference between unilateralism and multilateralism is largely "an illusory one"
and that "in the end, all decisions on the use of military force are unilateral." 86 Every nation will make its own, unilateral, decision whether or not to support a preemptive strategy against AlQaeda -it is the effect of the conflation of the preponderance of nations supporting such a strategy that, in the end, gives it a sense of international legitimacy. However, it is the exercise of US leadership in creating a clear shared vision that promotes unilateral support from each nation that will give the US greater strategic maneuverability through collective cooperation to execute preemptive operations against Al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, the United States reserves the right to act alone, preemption is not meant to tout unilateralism, in the pejorative sense, as having primacy in the US strategy. As National Security Advisor Rice points out, "this approach, unilateralism, must be treated with great caution. The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small." In addition to conventional law, specifically Article 51 of the UN Charter, I have argued that customary law, the behavior of states, is evolving toward greater acceptance of acts of selfdefense with the advent of such transnational threats as Al-Qaeda. Also, that the customary behavior of the United States, as it relates to preemption is of great importance, as it will likely become the basis for other nations to act. Therefore, it is paramount that our argument for preemption be compelling and moral. In that vein, I have argued that, as it relates to the reason for going to war, the jus ad bellum criteria of "last resort" is the only resort to preempt future attacks as Al-Qaeda is not subject to the normal deterrence means associated with a nation state. I have also argued that sovereignty is no longer an absolute concept. Nations have responsibilities as part of the international community to capture Al-Qaeda terrorists operating within their territory. Therefore, if a nation fails to comply with the UN resolutions to bring AlQaeda operatives to justice, the victim state may launch operations within another nation's territory -but only for the objective of striking the aforementioned Al-Qaeda operatives.
Finally, I have argued that while the legal aspects of a preemptive strategy are important there is also a need to achieve a degree of legitimacy. Specifically, legitimacy expressed through the opinions of nations can, in some instances, take precedence over legality.
Moreover, legitimacy is desired as it can significantly strengthen a preemptive strategy, providing the United States greater strategic maneuver through the cooperation of other nations.
Specifically, in order to develop legitimacy for a preemptive strategy we must have a more focused and shared vision of a war against Al-Qaeda as an organization, not the amorphous Global War on Terrorism. It can then garner international support, achieve legitimacy, and thus implement the strategy necessary to preempt further terrorist acts.
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